POSTER ABSTRACTS duction in specificity or incidence will reduce the PVP and raise the ratio of FP to TP; a reduction in sensitivity will also reduce the PVP. Efforts to improve the sensitivity and specificity of the screening method can increase PVP, but as long as incidence is low, the ratio of FP to TP will be high. There is a reticence to evaluate syndromic surveillance systems, which may be warranted. If the system has never experienced a TP, quantitative evaluation results are known in advance. There are three alternatives: process evaluation, evaluation of qualitative attributes, and simulations. The first two fail to assess how well the system finds cases of the target disease. The third may evoke the "Texas sharpshooter" fallacy: drawing the circle on the barn after shooting the rifle. If syndromic surveillance has value in detection of extremely rare events, evaluation remains a challenge. Syndromic surveillance systems are useful not only for early detection, but also for rapid monitoring of the spread of the outbreak. Syndromic surveillance systems based on single data sources have limited sensitivity, specificity, and predictive value. The aims of the current study were (1) to evaluate the contribution of multiple data sources to early detection and monitoring of unusual infectious disease outbreaks, (2) to evaluate LEADERS (Lightweight Epidemiology Advanced Detection and Emergency Response System) as a tool for syndromic surveillance systems, and (3) to evaluate dynamic changes in patterns of disease resulting from a simulated bioterror attack. Retrospective data on visits to community clinics and emergency rooms and reported deaths were used to generate mean and threshold incidence curves. The LEADERS platform was used for collection, storage, and analyses of data from different sources. A simulated anthrax outbreak based on the Svredlovsk outbreak was superimposed on background morbidity. GIS and SaTScan software (National Cancer Institute) were used for cluster analysis and the temporal-spatial changes in the different data sources were compared. A theoretical model demonstrates the progression from visits to outpatient clinics to admissions to emergency rooms to deaths. We conclude that differential dynamic changes in morbidity and mortality from different data sources are a useful means of detecting and monitoring unusual infectious disease outbreaks. More advanced statistical models will improve the performance of the system for early detection. A secured, Webbased system for integrating multiple data sources such as LEADERS will greatly facilitate the operation of the surveillance system.
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Use of Simulated

Implementing the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Early
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
This poster session demonstrates how the Early Aberration Reporting System (EARS), developed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), was implemented at a local health department in Knox County, Tennessee, to serve as an early warning system for possible bioterrorism events. EARS is based on aberration detection models developed by CDC to identify deviations in current data when compared to a historical mean. The Knox County Health Department currently receives daily data from four sources: the 911 emergency call center, the Knox County public school system, a local hospital emergency department, and a local outpatient physician's group. Specific syndromes were selected from each of these data sources by the Knox County public health officer and the state epidemiologist. The EARS programs, which operate on an SAS software platform, analyze daily events for aberrations. When syndromes are flagged as aberrations, epidemiological staff review output and conduct further analyses, including the use of Geographic Information Series (GIS) to examine spatial clustering. If warranted, further investigation will be initiated. The EARS programs are easy to operate and adaptable to various data sources. Future goals for the Knox County system include automating electronic file transfer to ease the burden on data providers and improve the timeliness and quality of data. Due to the success of the EARS system in Knox County, the Tennessee Department of Health has targeted CDC's EARS as a model for statewide dissemination as part of the state Bioterrorism Preparedness Plan.
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Strong surveillance infrastructure is critical for the ability of public health to detect and respond rapidly to a bioterrorism event. In 1999, San Diego County, California, developed the Enhanced Health Surveillance System, which includes various data sources, including prehospital chief complaints, foodborne illness complaints, medical examiner data, animal health data, and sentinel emergency department encounters. Also in 1999, San Diego developed the Emergency Medical Alert Network (EMAN), a bidirectional communications network that permits rapid notification of the medical community during emergencies and posts critical information to the EMAN Web site (www.emansandiego.com). San Diego is researching and applying aberration detection methodologies to syndromic data, including procedures to monitor large, nonrandom spikes (P Charts and U Charts) as well as small process shifts (exponentially weighted moving average [EWMA] and cumulative sum [CUSUM] charts). Intervention and response guidelines are in place to guide intervention and response efforts if aberrations are detected. Several events provided the opportunity to test the syndromic surveillance capabilities. During June 2001, San Diego hosted an international biotechnology convention. Syndromic surveillance was conducted using real-time prehospital chief complaint data, emergency department and urgent care encounters, and poison control data. After September 11, 2002, our early detection efforts detected a significant increase in prehospital transports for chest pain. Syndromic surveillance and aberration detection methodologies were to be expanded and refined during the Super Bowl. Plans exist to automate the systems, including data mining and the creation of decision models to improve timeliness and sensitivity. While systems may have been designed to detect acts of bioterrorism, they are proving invaluable for enhancing traditional surveillance efforts.
